the exploitation of occupied industrial societies Liberman, Peter 1962- creator text bibliography Case studies. nju Princeton, N.J Princeton University Press �1996 1996 monographic eng

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xi, 250 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm. Does Conquest Pay? demonstrates that expansion can, in fact, provide rewards to aggressor nations. Peter Liberman argues that invaders can exploit industrial societies for short periods of time and can maintain control and economic performance over the long term. This is because modern societies are uniquely vulnerable to coercion and repression. Hence, by wielding a gun in one hand and offering food with the other, determined conquerors can compel collaboration and suppress resistance. Liberman's argument is supported by several historical case studies: Germany's capture of Belgium and Luxembourg during World War I and of nearly all of Europe during World War II; France's seizure of the Ruhr in 1923-24; the Japanese Empire during 1910-45; and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe in 1945-89. Does Conquest Pay? suggests that the international systems is more war-prone than many optimists claim. Liberman's findings also contribute to debates about the stability of empires and other authoritarian regimes, the effectiveness of national resistance strategies, and the sources of rebellious collective action. Does conquest pay? -- When does conquest pay? -- Nazi-occupied Western Europe, 1940-1944 -- Belgium and Luxembourg, 1914-1918 -- The Ruhr-Rhineland, 1923-1924 -- The Japanese Empire, 1910-1945 -- The Soviet Empire, 1945-1989 -- The spoils of conquest. Peter Liberman. Includes bibliographical references (pages 209-242) and index. Military occupation Economic aspects Military occupation Economic aspects Case studies Military occupation Economic aspects Veroveringen Oorlogsbuit Kosten-batenanalyse Besatzungspolitik Besetzung Expansionspolitik Geschichte Wirtschaft Geschichte 1914-1989 Geschichte Military occupation Economic aspects Military occupation Economic aspects Case studies JZ6402 .L53 1996 325/.32/0904 89.91 15.09 83.00 83.20 0691029865 9780691029863 0691002428 9780691002422 95017925 http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/prin031/95017925.html http://www.gbv.de/dms/bowker/toc/9780691029863.pdf http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/description/prin021/95017925.html http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/prin031/95017925.html http://www.gbv.de/dms/bowker/toc/9780691029863.pdf http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/description/prin021/95017925.html DLC 950417 20180703110123.0 ocm32510188 eng